Russian Race to the Moon. N-1 Launch Vehicle.

In Russian (Soviet) space history – politics had a great influence on the Russian Manned Moon program (MMP).

With the N-1 and MMP there was a double political influence:
Outside – from the American side; and inside – especially because of the personal relationionship between the two Great Chief Designers – Korolyov and Chelomey – and the head of the Soviet Union (and Communist Party as well) – Nikita Khrushchev.

The most ambitious (and talented) Soviet Chief Designer Sergey Korolyov formulated the idea of a big space booster capable of delivering a man to the Moon – and even to Mars in late 50's. The design of that booster – N-1 – was started before President John F. Kennedy announced the American program, later known as Apollo.

1963: The N-1 booster was designed to deliver 40-50 ton manned spacecraft into space – orbit and than land on the Moon in 1967.

The plan served as confirmation of Korolyov's endless and very aggressive attempts with Moon probes in the early 60's.

When President Kennedy unannounced his plan to land on the Moon – Korolyov's dream became a reality, because Khrushchev could not even imagine. That with the "advantages of Communism" the Soviet Union could be anything but first. That's why all the "firsts" in Space – so far – were Russians: The first Sputnik, first Man, first Woman, first EVA, etc. – and it didn't matter to the government what it cost.

So – Korolyov got a green light, but – "The weather" (especially of Russian politicians) "...was always very changeable".

Korolyov's design of the booster was facing some difficulties. Very soon it became clear that N-1 with its capacity of 40-50 tons into orbit was not enough for a Moon orbiting and landing. Korolyov's efforts to increase the N-1's capacity met with another problem – Chief Designer Glushko – who would not agree to design the requested engines needed for the booster. Glushko was the best in engine design – his engines are very good even today.

As a result – there was a delay with the N-1 – but Khrushchev had a target – to be first on the Moon – and he had to achieve it.

Khrushchev's son, Sergey, was an aerospace engineer and was an employee of Chelomey's Design Bureau. He managed to attract his father's attention to a new booster, in design there since 1961 – the UR-500 – later to be known as "Proton".

That's why at the end of 1961 the Russian MMP was "split" into two programs:

First – orbiting the Moon using UR-500 – initial target – 1967-1968

Second – landing on the Moon using N-1 booster – initial target – Autumn of 1968.

Then all the problems started – both technical and human.

Because of Chelomey's influence at that time, the N-1 booster program was canceled in April 1962, but very soon – in September 1962, re-established again (as a result of some doubts about the UR-500).

There were 22 tests launches during the period of March 1967 – October 1970 involving the Orbiting Moon program and UR-500 booster. – and ONLY one was successful – August 8,1969 – the "Zond-7". It was looking like an uphill battle to be first.

Then came the Apollo-8 mission in December 1968 and clearly the Soviet Union would not be first. Suddenly and decisively, the Russian goal of orbiting Moon lost it's sense and political momentum.

When the N-1 booster program was re-established at the end of 1962 – there were many positive results derived from its design. Korolyov's influence and the technical skill of his associates made it possible to raise the capacity of the booster to 95 tons (actually equal to a Saturn-5 booster capacity) by the time of the first flight test.

Now, after being behind the American Apollo project for 5 years since 1965, they managed to come test the first booster in February 1969.

But there were two events in this story that influenced the program a hugely:

One was "positive" – the dismissal of Khrushchev in October 1964 – which put an end to the many deviations from the main program due to the caprice and will of the nation's leader. His successor, Brezhnev was equally dedicated to Soviet Space achievement, but recognized the superiority of Korolyov in the Space program.

The other – "negative" – was the unexpected death of Korolyov in January 1966. He was replaced by his deputy – Vasily Mishin, a person with much less influence and much less of a visionary.

The main technical problem of the N-1 booster was a complicated system of 32 engines, which had to be ignited simultaneously. Despite the fact that it had a unique design, which could be very effective, there simply wasn't enough time to perfect it. That became the main obstacle to success.

Taking in mind a date of Apollo-11 landing on the Moon – July 16,1969 – let's look at the list of N-1 test launches. Comparison will give you an understanding of tension in Soviet Leadership:

First test launch – February 21,1969 – 70 seconds into the flight an accident.

Second test launch – June 3,1969 – blast of one engine after 0.4 second
of flight. The booster fell on the launch pad 18th seconds after ignition. The entire launch pad, including a 5-story underground area, was destroyed.

At that time the "race" with the USA was lost, but tests were still continued:

Third test launch – June 27,1971 – using a second launch pad – an accident at 49 seconds into the flight. The booster fell and exploded.

Fourth test launch – November 23,1972 – explosion after 107 seconds of flight.

Up until 1974 activity continued. Then it was terminated from by higher ups. In 1976 the two remaining ready to fly boosters were destroyed.